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CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION:  THE 
SEC’S NEW ROLE AS DIPLOMATIC AND 
HUMANITARIAN WATCHDOG 
Karen E. Woody*  
 
Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act is an oft-overlooked provision requiring corporate 
disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals” in products manufactured by 
issuing corporations.  This Article scrutinizes the legislative history and 
lobbying efforts behind the conflict minerals provision to establish that, 
unlike the majority of the bill, its goals are moral and political, rather than 
financial.  Analyzing the history of disclosure requirements, the Article 
suggests that the presence of conflict minerals in an issuer’s product is not 
inherently material information and that the Dodd-Frank provision 
statutorily renders nonmaterial information material.  The provision, 
therefore, forces the SEC to expand beyond its congressional mandate of 
protecting investors and ensuring capital formation by requiring issuers to 
engage in additional nonfinancial disclosures in order to meet the 
provision’s humanitarian and diplomatic aims.  Further, the Article posits 
that the conflict minerals provision is a wholly ineffective means to 
accomplish its stated humanitarian goals and likely will cause more harm 
than good in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  In conclusion, this 
Article proposes that a more efficient regulatory model for conflict minerals 
is the Clean Diamond Trade Act and the Kimberly Process Certification 
Scheme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Buried in the voluminous Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank) is an oft-overlooked provision requiring 
corporate disclosure of the use of “conflict minerals” in products 
manufactured by issuing corporations.2  This provision, section 1502 of the 
Act, requires the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce 
and regulate corporate disclosures on the use of certain minerals originating 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or one of its 
neighboring countries.3  Although the thrust of Dodd-Frank concerns 
banking regulations and other measures focusing on the regulation of 
financial institutions,4 the legislative history of section 1502 reveals that 
	
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
section of the U.S. Code). 
 2. § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (Supp. V 2011)).  
“Conflict mineral” is defined in the Act as “(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as 
tantalum], cassiterite [also known as tin ore], gold, wolframite [also known as tungsten], or 
their derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the Secretary of 
State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining country.” § 1502(e)(4)(A)–(B). 
 3. See § 1502.  Because of the porous borders of the war-torn DRC and the ease with 
which smugglers and traders can transport the conflict minerals to the surrounding nations, 
the Act includes restrictions on exports from DRC’s neighboring countries. Id.  Neighboring 
countries include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
 4. Dodd-Frank was signed into law on July 21, 2010, by President Obama. See Status 
of H.R. 4173 (111th):  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
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Congress included it in the Act due to congressional concern about the 
continuing humanitarian crisis in the DRC.5  As will be discussed in depth 
	
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012).  The aim of the legislation was the enactment of financial regulatory reform in 
response to the recent financial crisis.  The Act consists of sixteen titles and drastically 
changed the existing financial regulatory structure.  Title I is the Financial Stability Act of 
2010 and creates the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), tasked with monitoring 
systemic risk in the U.S. financial system. See § 111.  The FSOC identifies gaps in 
regulations that pose a threat to financial stability and efficiency. See § 112.  Title I also 
creates the Office of Financial Research, tasked with data collection from bank holding 
companies and nonbank holding companies. See § 152.  Title II relates to the liquidation 
authority ascribed to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation. See §§ 201–217.  Title III, the Enhancing Financial Institution 
Safety and Soundness Act of 2010, abolishes the Office of Thrift Supervision in an attempt 
to streamline regulation authorities between different regulators. See §§ 312–313.  Title IV is 
the Private Fund Investment Advisors Registration Act of 2010 and is intended to increase 
regulation of hedge funds. See §§ 401–416.  Title V consists of the Federal Insurance Office 
Act of 2010 and the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010. See §§ 501–527.  
Title VI is the “Bank and Savings Association Holding Company and Depository Institution 
Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010” and includes the Volcker Rule, which limits the 
ability of banking entities to hold more than three percent of total ownership interest in 
hedge funds or private equity funds. See §§ 601, 619.  Title VII is the Wall Street 
Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010 and regulates over-the-counter swaps markets, 
including credit default swaps and derivatives. See §§ 701–774.  Title VIII is the Payment, 
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010, which increases regulation of clearing 
and settlement activities done by financial institutions. See §§ 801–814.  Title IX is the 
Investor Protections and Securities Reform Act of 2010, which restructures the regulatory 
powers of the SEC and implements additional regulations on broker-dealers, credit rating 
agencies, and those offering asset-backed securities and municipal securities. See §§ 901–
991.  Title X is the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 and establishes the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection. See §§ 1001–1100H.  Title XI deals with the additional 
governance and oversight the Act provides to the Federal Reserve System. See §§ 1101–
1109.  Title XII, or the Improving Access to Mainstream Financial Institutions Act of 2010, 
allows certain organizations to provide incentives to low- and middle-income participants in 
the financial system. See §§ 1201–1210.  Title XIII is the Pay It Back Act, which amends the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) by limiting the amount of funds available and 
prohibiting unused funds from being used for any new programs. See §§ 1301–1306.  Title 
XIV is the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, which establishes standards 
for mortgage loan organizations and appraisers. See §§ 1401–1498.  Title XV, where the 
conflict minerals provision is located, is simply deemed “Miscellaneous Provisions” and 
includes other nonfinancial provisions such as requirements to report on mine safety, 
requirements to report on payments by oil, gas, and mineral extractors, and additional 
evaluations required of the International Monetary Fund for loans to various countries. See 
§§ 1501–1506.  Finally, Title XVI deals with section 1256 Contracts of the Internal Revenue 
Code that deals with tax implications for futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, or 
nonequity options. See § 1601. 
 5. See § 1502(a) (“It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict 
minerals originating in the [DRC] is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme 
levels of violence . . . and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein 
. . . .”).  Congress initiated section 1502 as a result of the actions of a few Senators, 
particularly Senator Brownback. See Edward Wyatt, Congo Minerals Provision Becomes 
Part of Financial Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at B8.  Beyond the personal convictions 
of Senator Brownback and other Congressmen, the effort to pass legislation that attempts to 
quell the violence in the DRC has been actively supported by nonprofit groups such as the 
Enough Project, Global Witness, Resolve, and Friends of the Congo. See Letter from Fr. 
Rocco Puopolo, Exec. Dir., Africa Faith & Justice Network, et al., to Russ Feingold, U.S. 
 1318 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
below, section 1502 is not a “financial” regulation, but rather a provision 
aimed at ending the atrocities of a war occurring seven thousand miles from 
Wall Street.  In fact, the prologue of section 1502 expressly declares: 
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict 
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping 
to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and 
gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian 
situation therein, warranting the provisions of section 13(p) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by subsection (b).6 
 The eastern region of the DRC has been embroiled in one of the deadliest 
conflicts since World War II.7  Fueled by decades of ethnic tensions, the 
conflict in the region reached a tipping point when groups of militiamen 
fled across the border into the DRC following the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda.8  Although not the underlying cause of the war, mineral resources 
in the region supply the funding necessary for local rebel militias to 
continue the fight.9  Four minerals in particular have played an integral part 
	
Senator (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://opensocietypolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
Senator-Russ-Feingold-thank-you1.pdf. 
 6. § 1502(a). 
 7. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed, Death by Gadget, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at 
WK11.  The conflict in the DRC has claimed the lives of over 5.4 million people. Id. 
 8. Mary Beth Sheridan, Trying To Curb Trade of “Conflict Minerals,” WASH. POST, 
July 21, 2010, at A1.  The history of ethnic tensions in the region does not begin with the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994.  Rather, ethnic battles have plagued Congo for over a century. 
See Forever in Chains:  The Tragic History of Congo, INDEPENDENT (July 28, 2006), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/forever-in-chains-the-tragic-history-of-congo-
409586.html#.  Originally colonized in 1885 by Belgian King Leopold II, the DRC achieved 
independence from Belgium in 1960 but was ruled for the following thirty years by the 
authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. Id.  In 1997, Laurent Kabila toppled Mobutu’s 
regime, but the country was thrown into civil war, during which rebel groups took over 
various regions of the DRC. Id.  Kabila was assassinated in 2001 and power shifted to his 
son, Joseph Kabila, under whose reign the fighting has not ceased. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-763, CONFLICT MINERALS DISCLOSURE RULE:  SEC’S 
ACTIONS AND STAKEHOLDER-DEVELOPED INITIATIVES 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592458.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“As we reported in 
2010, illegal armed groups and some Congolese national military units are consistently and 
directly involved in human rights abuses against the civilian population in eastern DRC and 
are involved in the exploitation of conflict minerals and other trades.  We also reported that 
there is a culture of impunity in eastern DRC in which those who have committed human 
rights abuses do not face justice for the crimes they have committed.  After decades of 
instability and war, the central government in the capital, Kinshasa, currently has little 
administrative capacity and control over remote regions, including eastern DRC.  The long 
distances between the capital and eastern DRC and the rudimentary infrastructure, which 
make transportation and communication difficult, further limit the central government’s 
control in eastern DRC.”). 
 9. Shannon Raj, Note, Blood Electronics:  Congo’s Conflict Minerals and the 
Legislation That Could Cleanse the Trade, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 981, 985 (2011).  In addition 
to funding rebel militias, conflict minerals are often smuggled over the DRC border to 
neighboring countries in order to subvert or avoid taxation by the Congolese government. 
John Prendergast & Sasha Lezhnev, From Mine to Mobile Phone:  The Conflict Minerals 
Supply Chain, ENOUGH, 5 (NOV. 10, 2009),  http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/
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in the ongoing violence:  tin, tantalum, tungsten—also known as the 
“3Ts”10—and gold.  Because these minerals are intrinsically tied to the 
violence in the DRC, they are referred to as “conflict minerals” and are the 
subject of section 1502.11  
Section 1502 requires issuing companies to disclose whether they use 
any of the minerals included in the “conflict mineral” definition12 and to 
locate the source of the minerals they use.13  Although this may seem like a 
minor task, mandating disclosure of the origin of the minerals used in 
products is no small request to make of issuers who are now forced to 
scrutinize their supply chains.  Furthermore, the scope of issuers affected by 
this legislation is enormous, as thousands of companies manufacture and 
sell products containing at least one “conflict mineral.”  For example, the 
3Ts can be found in a number of consumer electronic goods, including cell 
phones and computers, as well as a number of other nonelectronic products 
such as certain types of packaging or even children’s shoes.14  Likewise, 
gold is found in jewelry, of course, but can also be found in electric plating 
and wiring as well as in components for jet engines.15  The number of 
industries, let alone individual companies, that section 1502 affects is 
daunting from a regulation standpoint.  Nevertheless, the SEC has been 
tasked with that regulation, despite never having had to tackle anything 
remotely similar to date. 
This Article will first discuss the history of disclosure requirements 
mandated by the SEC.  Part II will then examine the legislative history of 
	
minetomobile.pdf.  In Uganda, for example, over $74 million worth of gold was exported in 
2007 but only $600 worth of gold was produced by the country in that same year. Id.  
Similarly, Rwanda exported upwards of $30 million worth of tin in 2007 but only officially 
produced $8 million of that amount. Id. 
 10. See Prendergast & Lezhnev, supra note 9, at 1.  According to estimates, the mineral 
trade generates more than $180 million in profit for armed rebel groups in Congo. Roughly 
65 percent of the world’s coltan (which can be separated to produce tantalum) reserves are 
located in the DRC. Press Release, Brownback, Durbin Introduce Conflict Mining Bill (May 
23, 2008), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/359180/brownback-durbin-
introduce-conflict-mining-bill#.UGCQeZjK2fQ. But see Kristof, supra note 7 (“Even the 
Enough Project, an anti-genocide organization that has been a leading force in the current 
campaign, estimates that only one-fifth of the world’s tantalum comes from Congo.”). 
 11. See Dodd-Frank § 1502, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (Supp. V 2011). 
 12. See § 1502(e)(4) (defining conflict mineral as “columbite-tantalite (coltan), 
cassiterite, gold, wolframite, or their derivatives” or “any other mineral or its derivatives 
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining 
country”). 
 13. See § 1502(b). 
 14. See  Prendergast & Lezhnev, supra note 9, at 1.  Cassiterite, or tin, is used by the 
electronics, automotive, industrial manufacturing, and construction industries as a crucial 
component in solders for joining pipes and circuits; it is also used in automobile parts, steel 
plating, and various alloys. MICHAEL LITTENBERG ET AL., SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, 
CONFLICT MINERALS DUE DILIGENCE 4 (2012), available at http://www.srz.com/files/
upload/Littenberg_Damania_Valane_PLC_Nov_2011_Conflict_Minerals.pdf.  Children’s 
shoes that light up upon impact also contain cassiterite. Id. at 3.  Likewise, columbite-
tantalite, or coltan, is used in hearing aids, pacemakers, carbide tools, and jet engines. Id. at 
4.  Wolframite, or tungsten, is used in metal wires, electrodes, and welding instruments. Id. 
 15. LITTENBERG ET AL., supra note 14, at 4. 
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section 1502 and the SEC’s final rule implementing the provision.  In Part 
III, this Article will analyze the shortcomings of the new rule, including the 
costs imposed on affected industries, and the scope of statutory liability for 
noncompliance with the rule.  In Part IV, this Article will show that the 
regulation and enforcement of section 1502 falls well outside of the SEC’s 
mandate.  In doing so, this Article criticizes the efficacy of enacting 
disclosure requirements for U.S. companies with the aim of exacting a 
diplomatic and international benefit and demonstrates that the SEC is not 
the appropriate regulatory agency for accomplishing these diplomatic and 
humanitarian objectives.  Part IV then posits that the legislation will prove 
meaningless because if a company both uses conflict minerals and complies 
with section 1502, then there is no real consequence other than mere 
“naming and shaming.”  This Part also analyzes the use of section 1502 as 
an embargo with limited international cooperation that could lead to 
regulatory arbitrage.  Finally, Part V contemplates a different model for 
regulating conflict minerals using the example of the Kimberley Process 
and the regulation of conflict diamonds. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was founded in 1934 with the 
mandate that it would:  (a) protect investors; (b) maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets; and (c) facilitate capital formation.16  Notably absent 
from that mandate is any authority or charge to effect international, 
diplomatic, or human rights-oriented goals.  The focus, rather, is preserving 
market integrity.  The hallmark of the first two prongs of the mandate, 
investor protection and assurance of fair markets, lies in market 
transparency and is achieved through disclosure of material information to 
investors.17  As the SEC states on its own website:  “Only through the 
steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people 
make sound investment decisions.”18 
A.  Legislative History of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
In 1933, in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (’33 Act).19  The 
	
 16. The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate]. 
 17. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988); see also Cynthia A. 
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1199–1200 (1999). 
 18. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 16. 
 19. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–
77aa (2006)). 
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House Committee Report accompanying the ’33 Act20 quotes President 
Roosevelt in outlining the Act’s purpose:  “What we seek is a return to a 
clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those who manage banks, 
corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people’s money 
are trustees acting for others.”21  The ’33 Act’s primary means of regulating 
and enforcing accountability of banks and other financial institutions was 
disclosure.  Introducing the ’33 Act on the House floor on May 5, 1933, 
Representative Sam Rayburn stated: 
[T]oday the owner of shares in a corporation possesses a mere symbol of 
ownership, while the power, the responsibility, and the substance which 
have characterized ownership in the past have been transferred to a 
separate group which holds control. . . .  The owners of these symbols are 
entitled to know what the symbols represent. . . .  These managers are 
truly trustees.  One of their duties as trustees is to furnish security owners, 
in being and in prospect, with reliable information.22 
The House unanimously adopted Rayburn’s sponsored bill on a voice vote.  
The House bill became the final version of the bill, which passed the Senate 
on May 23, 1933, and was signed into law by President Roosevelt on May 
27, 1933.23  A few months later, in February 1934, Senator Duncan Fletcher 
and Representative Rayburn introduced the Securities Exchange Act of 
193424 (’34 Act) “for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of 
values, and, so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, 
	
 20. The bill was drafted by a team of representatives assembled by Felix Frankfurter that 
consisted of James Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas Corcoran, who reported to Sam 
Rayburn. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 61–63 (3d ed. 2003). 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933).  Professor Williams points out that Roosevelt was 
highly influenced by the writings of Louis Brandeis and his emphasis on the importance of 
disclosure in securities regulation. Williams, supra note 17, at 1212–14.  Indeed, Brandeis is 
oft-quoted for the saying:  “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
most efficient policeman.” Id. at 1212.  Professor Williams also notes that Brandeis greatly 
influenced Felix Frankfurter, who was instrumental in passing the Securities Act of 1933 and 
was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court by Roosevelt. Id. at 1221–22. 
 22. 77 CONG. REC. 2910 (1933) (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn).  In his introduction, 
Congressman Rayburn relied on a book by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, which pointed 
out the drastically increasing rise in economic power that large corporations enjoyed. Id. at 
2918 (citing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).  Berle and Means noted that in large corporations, ownership 
and control became increasingly separated and that, without adequate accountability, 
“controllers” could profit from actions that were not in shareholders’ interests. See ADOLF A. 
BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
119–25 (1932).  Because of this, Berle and Means argued for a shift in management’s 
fiduciary duties. See id. at 220–32.  In addition, Berle and Means emphasized that disclosure 
requirements would promote market efficiency and price discovery, and would act as an 
additional means of accountability for corporate managers. See id. at 317–25. 
 23. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 38. 
 24. 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006)).  The 
’34 Act created the SEC and empowered it with broad authority over the securities industry, 
including the power to require periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly 
traded securities. See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
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unwise, and destructive speculation.”25  The Senate Committee Report, 
acknowledging that the individual stock exchanges faced challenges when 
attempting to increase the amount of information that companies disclosed, 
made clear that the prerequisite for trading on an exchange would be the 
“furnishing of complete information relative to the financial condition of 
the issuer, which information shall be kept up to date by adequate periodic 
reports.”26  Similarly, the House Committee Report underscored the 
importance of “honest publicity” in the disclosure of complete and accurate 
financial statements on a regular basis in order to achieve accurate valuation 
of securities.27 
In passing the ’33 and ’34 Acts, Congress mandated regular material 
disclosures by companies with publicly traded securities.28  First, 
companies must make initial disclosures when new securities are issued to 
the public.29  Thereafter, public companies must make periodic disclosures 
quarterly and annually.30  Disclosures are also required regarding elections 
at annual shareholder meetings,31 as well as when any major corporate 
event takes place, such as a merger or sale of the business.32 
B.  The Importance of Materiality 
The disclosure regime established in the ’33 and ’34 Acts is intended to 
be a regulatory mechanism that allows for investor protection and accurate 
valuations of securities.33  Disclosure regulations also boost investor 
confidence and incentivize corporate managers to behave more diligently.34  
To comply with disclosure regulations, publicly traded companies must 
	
 25. 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
 26. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 10 (1934). 
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11–12 (1934). 
 28. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa (2006)); 48 Stat. 881. 
 29. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5, 7, 10. 
 30. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 15D. 
 31. Id. §§ 14(f), 15. 
 32. Id. § 14. 
 33. See generally Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure 
Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004).  Professor Guttentag 
analyzes the economic and regulatory benefits of imposing additional disclosure 
requirements on public companies when balanced against the costs of disclosure by private 
or public firms. See generally id. at 132–65.  He points out that disclosure requirements can 
improve share price accuracy, reduce the amount of information to which only managers 
have access, and reduce agency costs because the more the parties to a transaction are 
informed, the less they will need a regulator to evaluate the merits of the transaction. Id. at 
133–35. 
 34. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:  
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 146 
(2006) (“The emphasis in securities law on providing information to the public is premised 
on the belief that individuals are rational, self-governing actors who are willing and able to 
process the information wisely.  If we assume that investors are rational risk calculators who 
are consistently capable of weighing the costs and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting 
the best option, then a system of disclosure makes good sense.”). 
 2012] CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION 1323 
disclose any information considered material.35  The ’33 and ’34 Acts 
prohibit the disclosure of any untrue statement of material fact or any 
omission of material fact.36  Neither Congress, the SEC, nor the Supreme 
Court defined “material information” until 1976, when the Court resolved 
the issue in TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.37  Specifically, the Court held 
that a material fact is one that “would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”38  This was generally understood to mean “information that 
significantly affected a company’s financial performance and consequently 
translated into stock market gains or losses.”39 
In 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard of materiality in 
Basic v. Levinson40 and unanimously held that a bright-line rule regarding 
what information is considered material is inappropriate and unnecessary.41  
The Court stated that materiality is, as Professor Langevoort described, 
“about what is important to investors, nothing more and nothing less.”42  
Specifically, the Basic Court held that a fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it 
important in deciding how to vote in a corporate election.43  The Court 
applied the “probability times magnitude test” for estimating when 
speculative or forward-looking information is sufficiently important to rise 
to the level of “material.”44 
Since its TSC and Basic rulings, the Supreme Court, as well as the SEC 
through its regulations, has implicitly defined material information as 
information that bears on the economic value of an investment.45  The 
	
 35. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988). 
 36. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 78j.  SEC Rules expanded on this general theory.  For 
example, Regulation S-K sets forth certain information that companies must disclose. 17 
C.F.R. § 229 (2012).  Likewise, Rule 408 and Rule 12b-20 provide that “there shall be added 
such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required 
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.” Id. 
§§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20.  Failure to comply with these rules can expose a company to 
Rule 10b-5 antifraud liability. Id. § 240.10b-5. 
 37. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 38. Id. at 449. 
 39. John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality:  The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an 
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 42 (1998).  Fedders points out that in the 
wake of TSC Industries, the SEC attempted to adopt a qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
standard for materiality and traces the SEC’s efforts throughout the 1970s and 1980s to 
enforce qualitative disclosure. Id. at 43.  Qualitative disclosure included unadjudicated 
violations of law, as well as the issuer’s or management’s antisocial or unethical behavior, 
regardless of the impact on the issuer’s bottom line. Id. at 43–44.  Fedders concludes that the 
qualitative standard has since met its demise because “[i]t was a standard that had no 
standards.” Id. at 86. 
 40. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 41. Id. at 249. 
 42. Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty:  Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152 (2009). 
 43. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Williams, supra note 17, at 1264. 
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SEC’s understanding of the materiality standard is that a reasonable 
investor “generally focuses on matters that have affected, or will affect, a 
company’s profitability and financial outlook.”46  As will be described in 
more depth below, congressional action since the ’33 and ’34 Acts has 
sought to enlarge the scope of the materiality definition to include 
nonfinancial information, including the issuer’s use of conflict minerals as 
mandated in section 1502. 
II.  DODD-FRANK SECTION 1502 
In 2001, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in response to the unending 
violence and human rights abuses occurring in the DRC, passed a resolution 
in which it condemned “all illegal exploitation of the natural resources of 
the [DRC], demand[ed] that such exploitation cease and stress[ed] that the 
natural resources of the [DRC] should not be exploited to finance the 
conflict in that country.”47  Subsequently, the UNSC called on member 
states to “take measures, as they deem appropriate, to ensure that importers, 
processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products under 
their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the origin 
of the minerals they purchase.”48 
Eight years later, in the summer of 2009, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton visited the DRC to encourage the Congolese government and the 
United Nations to end the violence that is ravaging the country.49  Secretary 
Clinton’s publicized concerns with the state of affairs in the DRC was not 
news to then-Senator Sam Brownback, who had already drafted legislation 
requiring action to alleviate the crisis in the DRC.50  Senators Richard 
Durbin and Russ Feingold had also traveled to the DRC and were struck by 
the deleterious humanitarian situation.  Joined by Congressman Jim 
McDermott, the Senators introduced new legislation to address the crisis.51  
	
 46. Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from David B.H. 
Martin, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to Laura Unger, Acting Chair, SEC (May 8, 2001)). 
 47. S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1376 (Nov. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1376(2001). 
 48. S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1857(2008). 
 49. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Clinton Presses Congo on Illicit Minerals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 2009, at A7.  Of particular concern for Secretary Clinton was the increased violence 
against women, as she declared, “Women are being turned into weapons of war.” Id.  More 
than 200,000 rapes were reported since the beginning of the current war in DRC, resulting in 
eastern Congo being labeled the “rape capital of the world.” See Margot Wallstrom, 
“Conflict Minerals” Finance Gang Rape in Africa, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2010, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/14/conflict-minerals-finance-gang-rape.  
The militant groups have used sexual violence as a war tactic. Id. 
 50. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 51. See Press Release, Russ Feingold, U.S. Senator, Feingold Statement on Congo 
Conflict Minerals and Transparency Amendments to Financial Regulatory Reform Bill (May 
19, 2010), available at http://www.africafocus.org/printit/mob.php?http://www.africafocus.
org/docs10/cgk1007a.php (“This amendment specifically responds to the continued crisis in 
the eastern region of the [DRC].  Despite efforts to curb the violence, mass atrocities and 
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The result of the initial efforts by Senators Brownback, Feingold, and 
Durbin was section 1502, which was added to Dodd-Frank in the Senate 
during floor debate on the initial Senate version (i.e., the pre-conference-
committee version) of the bill.52  Eventually, Amendment No. 3997, also 
known as the Brownback Amendment and later section 1502, was 
confirmed by unanimous consent pursuant to a voice vote.53 
A.  Legislative History and the Evolution of Section 1502 
The genesis of section 1502 reveals a great deal about the goals of its 
drafters.  As early as 2008, variations of legislation similar to the 
Brownback Amendment had been put forth by members of Congress, often 
by Senator Brownback himself.  In May 2008, Senator Brownback 
introduced a bill in the Senate Finance Committee, which was cosponsored 
by Senator Durbin, called the Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite Act of 2008 
(CCCA).54  This bill, had it become law, would have made it unlawful to 
import products from the DRC that contain coltan or cassiterite.55  At the 
time of this bill’s introduction, Senator Brownback stated in a press release 
that this legislation was intended to “bring accountability and transparency 
to the supply chain of minerals used in the manufacturing of many 
electronic devices.”56 
The CCCA never received a floor vote, and on April 23, 2009, Senator 
Brownback again introduced legislation, this time in the Senate Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, to address the humanitarian crisis 
in the DRC.57  The contours of Senator Brownback’s subsequently 
proposed bill, called the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 (CCMA), 
were much more closely aligned with the Brownback Amendment.  The 
CCMA took a noted step back from the more aggressive CCCA in that it 
did not include criminal penalties for willfully violating the CCMA’s other 
provisions.58  Like the Brownback Amendment, the CCMA would have 
amended the ’34 Act by adding certain disclosure requirements, and it 
	
widespread sexual violence and rape continue at an alarming rate.  Some have justifiably 
labeled eastern Congo as ‘the worst place in the world to be female.’  Several of us in this 
body, including Senators Brownback and Durbin and I, have traveled to this region and seen 
first-hand the tragedy of this relentless crisis.”). 
 52. See 156 CONG REC. S3865–66 (daily ed. May 18, 2010). 
 53. See id. 
 54. S. 3058, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 55. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 56. Press Release, Sam Brownback, supra note 10. 
 57. Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009).  Similar 
legislation was proposed in the House of Representatives by Rep. Jim McDermott. See 
Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 58. Compare S. 891, with S. 3058.  According to Senator Feingold, “[W]e must tread 
carefully because there are many communities in eastern Congo whose livelihoods are 
intertwined with the mining economy.  All-out prohibitions or blanket sanctions could be 
counterproductive and negatively affect the very people we seek to help.  I am confident that 
[the CCMA] is sensitive to that complex reality.” 155 CONG REC. 10600 (2009) (statement 
of Sen. Feingold). 
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would have made it U.S. policy to promote peace and security in the 
DRC.59 
Several important differences exist between the reporting requirements 
mandated by the proposed CCMA and section 1502.  For example, the 
disclosure requirements under section 1502 apply only to those who require 
conflict minerals for “the functionality or production of a product 
manufactured by such person.”60  The proposed CCMA, on the other hand, 
would have applied to persons who engaged in “the commercial 
exploration, extraction, importation, exportation, or sale of” conflict 
minerals or use conflict minerals “in the manufacture of a product for 
sale.”61  Moreover, the CCMA would have applied the disclosure 
requirements not only to parties that engage in the relevant activities but 
also to any person who controls another person or entity (defined as 
controlling 50 percent of the voting stock or capital) that engages in the 
relevant activities.62  Conversely, section 1502 applies only to those persons 
who actually manufacture or contract to manufacture the products.63  Thus, 
section 1502’s disclosure requirements apply to a substantially narrower 
group of companies than the CCMA.  Nevertheless, this legislation affects 
companies throughout the entire supply chain because they need to be 
prepared to respond to due diligence requests from those subject to the 
disclosure requirements. 
Besides the difference in scope, there are several other important 
differences between the proposed CCMA and section 1502.  One important 
difference is that section 1502 requires an independent audit of the source 
and chain of custody of the conflict minerals, along with an identification of 
the auditor, the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country 
of origin of the conflict minerals, and the efforts used to determine the mine 
location.64  The CCMA would have only required the disclosure of the mine 
	
 59. See S. 891 §§ 3, 5.  Ultimately, this bill was cosponsored by twenty-two senators in 
addition to Senator Brownback. See Status of S. 891 (111th):  Congo Conflict Minerals Act 
of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012).  At the time the CCMA was introduced in committee, Senator Brownback stated, 
“We have taken a strong hard look at [the CCCA] and have done our best to improve on it.” 
155 CONG. REC. 10598 (2009) (statement of Sen. Brownback).  Senator Feingold, joining as 
an original co-sponsor, added that “the long-term goal is not to shut this trade down, but to 
support a conflict-free mining economy that benefits the Congolese people.” Id. at S4697 
(statement of Sen. Feingold). 
 60. Dodd Frank, § 1502(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2011).  The SEC’s final 
rule did not shed much light on what will be considered “necessary for the functionality or 
production of a product” and instead indicated that it would be a fact based determination on 
a case-by-case basis. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,349 (Sept. 12, 
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).  Notably, the SEC’s final rule omitted a 
de minimis exception, so any trace amount of a conflict mineral in a product will require the 
issuer to comply with section 1502. Id. at 56,298. 
 61. S. 891 § 5. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Dodd-Frank § 1502(b). 
 64. See id. 
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of origin of the conflict minerals with no independent audit necessary.65  
Additionally, the final version of section 1502 deleted a provision that 
would have allowed the SEC to review or temporarily waive the disclosure 
requirements if the SEC determined that a waiver was “(A) necessary for 
the protection of investors; and (B) in the public interest.”66  Another 
important difference is that the CCMA would not have obligated companies 
to post the required disclosures on their company website.67  Overall, these 
changes were a product of Congress’s additional consideration of the 
complex issues surrounding conflict minerals and the influence of a myriad 
of industry members affected by the legislation.68 
B.  What Section 1502 Requires 
Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank amends section 13 of ‘the ’34 Act69 by 
increasing mandatory disclosure requirements for producers of goods that 
include minerals derived from the DRC.70  In general, this provision 
mandates the annual disclosure of whether conflict minerals necessary in 
the production of a company’s manufactured goods originate in the DRC or 
an adjoining country.71  The term “conflict mineral” is defined to mean 
“(A) columbite-tantalite (coltan) [also known as tantalum], cassiterite [also 
known as tin ore], gold, wolframite [also known as tungsten], or their 
derivatives; or (B) any other mineral or its derivatives determined by the 
Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the [DRC] or an adjoining 
country.”72  If the conflict minerals in use originated in the DRC or an 
adjoining country, the disclosing party must submit a report to the SEC that 
includes:  (i) a description of the due diligence process undertaken by the 
disclosing party with regard to the source and chain of custody of those 
conflict minerals, which must be independently audited;73 and (ii) a 
description of the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured 
that are not “DRC conflict free,” the identity of the independent auditor of 
the source and supply chain, the facilities that process the conflict minerals 
used by the disclosing party, the country from which the conflict minerals 
were obtained, and the efforts used to determine the origin (i.e., the specific 
	
 65. See S. 891 § 5. 
 66. Compare § 1502(b), with S. 891 § 5. 
 67. Compare § 1502(b), with S. 891. 
 68. According to Senator Feingold, “The Brownback amendment was narrowly crafted 
in consideration of [industry members’] challenges, and it includes waivers and a sunset 
clause after five years” to help properly balance the competing concerns. Press Release, Russ 
Feingold, supra note 51. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
 70. Dodd-Frank, § 1502(b). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A).  “Adjoining countries” include Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
 72. Dodd-Frank § 1502(e)(4)(A)–(B). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i).  This independent audit must be certified by the 
disclosing party, which is an integral part of the due diligence process. Id.  Additionally, this 
audit must be considered reliable by the SEC. See id. § 78m(p)(1)(C). 
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mine) of the conflict mineral.74  For a product to be considered “DRC 
conflict free,” the product must not contain minerals that finance, directly or 
indirectly, any armed groups in the DRC or adjoining countries.75 
The reach of this disclosure requirement extends to any individual or 
company subject to any of the ’34 Act’s disclosure requirements if such 
companies or individuals require conflict minerals in the production of the 
products they manufacture or contract to be manufactured.76  Beyond 
making the relevant disclosures to the SEC, those subject to this provision 
must post the required disclosures on their company websites.77 
Within 270 days of the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC was required to 
promulgate regulations concerning the disclosure requirements mandated 
under subsection (p) of the ’34 Act.78  The SEC issued proposed regulations 
in December 2010,79 and received thousands of comments during the 
comment period.80  In April 2011, the SEC announced that its target date 
for publication of the final rule would be between August 2011 and 
December 2011.81  Because of the numerous and varied concerns expressed 
by companies that are required to comply with the new provision, the SEC 
held a roundtable discussion in October 2011 to discuss stakeholder issues.  
In December 2011, the SEC stated that it would issue its final rule between 
January and June 2012.82  Due to the intensity of comments from the 
public, Congress, and affected companies, as well as the amount of time 
that was required to perform an economic analysis, the SEC again delayed 
the final rule, but stated in July 2012 that it would vote on the final rule on 
August 22, 2012.83  On that date, the final rule was issued and adopted by 
the Commission by a 3–2 vote.84 
	
 74. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 75. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(D). 
 76. Id. § 78m(p)(2)(A)–(B). 
 77. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(E). 
 78. Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A). 
 79. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b). 
 80. See Proposed Rule:  Conflict Minerals, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Comments on Proposed Rule]. 
 81. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at prologue.  The SEC delayed issuing the final 
rules due to the complexity of the regulation and the numerous amounts of comments 
provided by industry members, congressional representatives, and nongovernmental 
organizations. See Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 80.  The comment period was 
opened again in the fall of 2011 to allow additional comments on the proposed rules. 
Conflict Minerals Final Rule Deadline Postponed Again:  SEC Makes It Official, 
SUSTAINABILITY COUNSEL (Jan. 17, 2012, 8:44 AM), http://sustainability-
counsel.com/2012/01/17/conflict-minerals-final-rule-deadline-postponed-again-sec-makes-
it-official/. 
 82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 8. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Press Release, SEC Adopts Rule for Disclosing Use of Conflict Minerals (Aug. 22, 
2012), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-163.htm.  Commissioners Schapiro, 
Aguilar, and Walter voted in favor of the final rule; Commissioners Paredes and Gallagher 
dissented. See Edith Orenstein, SEC Narrowly Passes Conflict Minerals, Resource 
Extraction Rules, FIN. REPORTING BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://www.financial
 2012] CONFLICT MINERALS LEGISLATION 1329 
C.  The SEC’s Final Rule:  Three Steps for Compliance 
The SEC’s regulations set out three steps issuers should follow in order 
to comply with the requirements of section 1502.85  These steps are outlined 
below. 
1.  Determining if the Provision Applies 
 First, issuers must determine whether section 1502 applies to them.86  As 
noted above, the provision applies to any issuer that files reports with the 
SEC under section 13(a) or 15(d) of the ’34 Act, and for which conflict 
minerals are necessary to the functionality or production of a product 
manufactured by that issuer.87  According to the SEC’s final rule, issuers 
that directly manufacture products using conflict minerals, as well as those 
that contract the manufacturing of such products, are subject to the rule.88  
Under the proposed rule, this included issuers selling generic products 
under their own name brand, as long as the issuer had contracted with 
another party to have the product manufactured specifically for that 
issuer.89  However, under the final rule, the SEC narrowed the scope of 
companies considered to have “contracted to manufacture” certain products.  
Specifically, a company is considered to be “contracting to manufacture” a 
product if it has some actual influence over the manufacturing of that 
product.90  The SEC clarified this definition by listing examples of when a 
company is not deemed to have influence over the manufacturing of a 
product such as (1) if a company merely affixes its brand, marks, logo or 
label to a generic product manufactured by a third party; (2) if a company 
services, maintains, or repairs a product manufactured by a third party; or 




 85. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,283 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 56,274.  Although the proposed rule stated that the SEC would consider miners 
as “manufacturers” subject to the regulation, the SEC exempted miners from the definition 
of manufacturers in its final rule.  Compare id. at 56,292, with Conflict Minerals Proposed 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,972 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 
249b). 
 88. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,288. 
 89. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,952. 
 90. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,291.  Thus, under the proposed rule, 
Costco would have been a good example of a nonmanufacturer that contracted for the 
manufacturing of its own products, namely its Kirkland Signature brand. See Conflict 
Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,952.  Under the final rule, however, Costco does 
not fall under the definition of manufacturer unless it has “actual influence over the 
manufacturing” of the products to which it affixes its label. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 
Fed. Reg. at 56,291.  This change to the final rule came as a result of aggressive lobbying by 
major retailers such as Wal-Mart and Target. See Jessica Holzer, Wal-Mart, Target Avoid 
Mining Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2012, at B1.   
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manufacturer that do not directly relate to the manufacturing of the 
product.91 
In addition, in assessing whether the provision applies, issuers must 
determine if the conflict minerals are “necessary” to the functionality or 
production of the product.92  The SEC did not define when a conflict 
mineral is necessary to the functionality or production of a product in its 
proposed rule; however, the two congressional sponsors of section 1502 
indicated in a comment letter that they believe the provision should cover 
“all uses of conflict minerals coming from DRC—except those that are 
‘naturally occurring’ or ‘unintentionally included’ in the product.”93  The 
SEC’s final rule stated that issuers should consider whether the conflict 
mineral is necessary to the product’s “generally expected function, use or 
purpose,” and if the conflict mineral is included only for purposes of 
decoration or embellishment, whether the primary purpose of the product is 
ornamentation. 94  Notably absent from the final rules is a de minimis 
exception for such products.  Therefore, any product with any trace of 
conflict minerals that are necessary to the functionality or production of the 
product must comply with the rule’s disclosure requirements. 
2.  Determining if the Minerals are “Conflict” 
Once issuers have determined that their products contain minerals listed 
in section 1502, they must determine if these minerals are conflict minerals, 
as defined by the statute, and conduct an inquiry into the origin of the 
contents of their products.95  In determining the origin of the minerals, the 
regulation requires a “reasonable country of origin inquiry,” undertaken in 
good faith.96  However, the SEC did not set forth guidelines as to what 
constitutes a reasonable country of origin inquiry.97  Nevertheless, the rule 
requires that issuers disclose the origin of the minerals, even if the origin is 
not the DRC or a neighboring country.98 
The SEC clarified that one way for an issuer to satisfy the reasonable 
country of origin inquiry is for the issuer to receive reasonably reliable 
representations from the facility that processed its conflict minerals that 
those minerals did not originate from the DRC or a neighboring country.99  
This concept of a “conflict-free smelter” as satisfying the requirement under 
section 1502 has spurred some industry participants to implement a 
	
 91. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,291. 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2011). 
 93. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,953. 
 94. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,297. 
 95. Id. at 56,291. 
 96. Id. at 56,310–12. 
 97. Id. at 56,311 (“The final rule does not specify what steps and outcomes are necessary 
to satisfy the reasonable country of origin inquiry requirement because, as stated in the 
Proposing Release, such a determination depends on each issuer’s particular facts and 
circumstances.”). 
 98. Id. at 56,314–15. 
 99. Id. at 56,312. 
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conflict-free smelter program aimed at creating a list or network of clean 
smelters.100 
If, after completing a reasonable country of origin inquiry, the company 
knows or has reason to believe that the minerals did not originate in any of 
the listed countries or are from scrap or recycled sources, the company must 
provide a brief description of the basis for its determination.101  This 
disclosure must be provided on newly created Form SD, which the issuer 
must file with the SEC.102  The issuer must also post that description on its 
website and disclose the website address to the SEC on Form SD.103 
On the other hand, if a company knows or has reason to believe that the 
minerals may have originated in one of the listed countries or may not be 
from scrap or recycled sources, the company must perform due diligence on 
the source and supply chain of its minerals and submit a Conflict Minerals 
Report (CMR) as an exhibit to Form SD.104  The CMR must also be posted 
on the company website.105 
3.  Creating the Conflict Mineral Report 
The CMR itself must include proof that the company conducted due 
diligence on the source and supply chain of the conflict minerals.106  The 
quality of this due diligence must meet a standard that is nationally or 
internationally recognized, such as the due diligence guidance approved by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).107 
A company’s products can still be labeled “DRC conflict free” if the 
minerals originate from one of the listed countries but they did not finance 
or benefit armed groups.108  If a company determines, after conducting due 
diligence, that its products are “DRC conflict free,” it is not required to file 
a CMR with its Form SD, but must include in its Form SD a description of 
the due diligence undertaken and the results thereof.109 
If, after conducting due diligence, a company cannot assert that its 
products are “DRC conflict free,” then the company must state in its CMR:  
(1) that the products manufactured or contracted to be manufactured have 
	
 100. See Elec. Indus. Citizenship Coal., Inc. & Global e-Sustainability Initiative, EICC-
GeSI Conflict Free Smelter Assessment Program:  Frequently Asked Questions, CONFLICT 
FREE SMELTER, 12 (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.conflictfreesmelter.org/documents/Conflict-
FreeSmelterFAQ.pdf.  Elements of the conflict-free smelter program include:  (1) due 
diligence where companies work with their suppliers to verify the smelters in their mineral 
supply chain; (2) third-party validation of a smelter’s sourcing practices and a determination 
of whether its sources are conflict free; and (3) an in-region mineral certification system that 
enables the traceability and certification of minerals mined in the DRC. Id. 9–11. 
 101. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,285. 
 102. Id. at 56,312. 
 103. Id. at 56,361–63. 
 104. Id. at 56,320–24. 
 105. Id. at 56,333. 
 106. Id. at 56,320–24. 
 107. Id. at 56,324. 
 108. Id. at 56,317. 
 109. Id. at 56,320–21. 
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not been found to be “DRC conflict free”; (2) the facilities used to process 
the conflict minerals; (3) the country of origin of the conflict minerals; and 
(4) the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the “greatest 
possible specificity.”110  In addition, the company must (1) obtain an 
independent private sector audit of its CMR; (2) certify that it obtained the 
audit; (3) identify the auditor; and (4) append a copy of the audit report as 
part of the CMR.111    
Finally, if a company is unable to determine whether its products are 
“DRC conflict free,” because it cannot determine the country of origin or 
whether the minerals in its products financed or benefited armed groups, it 
will be subject to a temporary two-year transition period during which its 
products will be labeled “DRC conflict undeterminable.”112  For smaller 
reporting companies, the temporary transition period is extended to four 
years.113  The company must still file a CMR, stating:  (1) the facilities used 
to process the conflict minerals; (2) the country of origin, if known; (3) the 
efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with the greatest possible 
specificity; and (4) the steps the company has taken or will take to mitigate 
the risk that its necessary conflict minerals benefit armed groups, including 
any steps to improve its due diligence process.114  In this case, however, the 
company is not required to obtain an independent private sector audit of its 
CMR.115 
III.  LOGISTICAL ISSUES WITH IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1502 
Section 1502 presents a number of potential challenges.  It creates 
significant hurdles to issuers, and costs of compliance with the regulation 
could be astronomical, depending on the issuer and its product.  The 
provision itself is also vague, creating additional obstacles to effective and 
efficient compliance.  In addition, it places an unrealistic burden on the 
SEC to regulate a provision aimed at eradicating human rights abuses—an 
area in which the SEC does not tread. 
A.  Cost of Compliance 
Section 1502 has a number of critics in all arenas that cite a variety of 
obstacles with the implementation of the provision.116  The sharpest 
criticisms of section 1502 came from industry members who the 
requirement will affect and who believe the requirement is overly 
burdensome in terms of cost.117  The SEC was well aware of the economic 
	
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 56,281. 
 114. Id. at 56,320–21. 
 115. Id. at 56,321. 
 116. See Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 80 (listing comment letters received by 
the SEC). 
 117. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,286, 56,291. 
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concerns surrounding the rule, as numerous comments to the SEC from 
industry members stressed the financial burdens of compliance.118  The 
SEC estimated in its proposed rule that the cost for those affected by the 
regulation will total approximately $71 million.119  In its final rule, 
however, the SEC estimated that the financial burden would be 
approximately $3–4 billion at the outset in order for companies to develop 
compliance programs.120  The SEC then estimated that it would cost 
approximately $207–609 million for annual ongoing compliance.121  
However, the National Association of Manufacturers estimates that the 
compliance costs will be between $8 and $16 billion.122   
Nonprofit lobbying groups have rebutted the arguments claiming that the 
legislation is too burdensome to implement, pointing to a statement made 
by Hewlett Packard—in front of several other titans of the electronics 
industry—that compliance with section 1502 would cost those companies 
less than one cent per product.123  The Hewlett Packard statement, however, 
might not be indicative of the costs across the industry, according to a 
Tulane Law study undertaken in October 2011.124  The Tulane study found 
that the proposed rule’s estimated cost of $71.2 million underestimated the 
implementation cost, in part because it did not take into account the range 
of actors affected by the law.125  The study further noted, “On the other 
hand, the [National Association of Manufacturers’] estimate of $9–16 
billion overstates these costs by inflating the supplier number and not taking 
into account significant overlap in supplier/customer relationships, as well 
as cost efficiencies from existing (and developing) information exchange 
	
 118. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Cecilia L. Gardner, Pres., CEO & Gen. Counsel, 
Jewelers Vigilance Comm., et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 2, 2011) 
[hereinafter JVC Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-
10/s74010-144.pdf. 
 119. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,965 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b). 
 120. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,334. 
 121. Id.  The SEC acknowledged in the open meeting issuing the final rule that 
pinpointing an actual estimate for this rule was nearly impossible due to the number of 
assumptions those creating the economic analysis had to make. Daniel M. Gallagher, 
Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting:  Proposed Rule to Implement Section 1502 
of the Dodd-Frank Act—the “Conflict Minerals” Provision (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 
Statement of Commissioner Gallagher], available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2012/
spch082212dmg-minerals.htm. 
 122. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,334. 
 123. See Intel Hit by Protests over Congo Minerals, THINQ.CO.UK (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.thinq.co.uk/2010/5/27/intel-hit-by-protests-over-congo-minerals/ [hereinafter 
Intel & Congo Minerals]. 
 124. See Chris Bayer, A Critical Analysis of the SEC and NAM Economic Impact Models 
and the Proposal of a 3rd Model in View of the Implementation of Section 1502 of the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS (Oct. 
17, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/tulane-study.pdf. 
 125. Id. at 3. 
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platforms.”126  Based on its own assessments, the Tulane study estimated 
the cost of implementing the regulation to be $7.93 billion.127 
Citing the Tulane study, additional comment letters were sent to the SEC, 
including one from Senator Olympia Snowe and other members of 
Congress, pressing the SEC to consider the cost to small businesses forced 
to comply with section 1502.128  In her letter, Snowe wrote that members of 
the Senate and House Small Business Committees were concerned that the 
SEC’s initial analysis of the costs of the proposed rule and its impact on 
small businesses was inadequate.129  Among other things, the Senator urged 
the SEC to consider adding a de minimis standard to the regulation, 
exempting products that contain less than a set amount of conflict minerals 
from the regulation.130  In addition, they encouraged the SEC to consider 
creating an “indeterminate origin” category within the rule to allow for a 
more lenient standard for compliance if small businesses are unable to 
determine the origin of the minerals.131  Although the SEC raised its cost 
estimates in the final rule, it still did not carve out any exemptions for small 
businesses nor did it exempt the de minimis use of conflict minerals.132 
Indeed, despite including an economic analysis of the regulation in the 
SEC final rule, the business community has already challenged the SEC 
over the costs associated with compliance, and recent case law indicates 
that the SEC may be fighting a losing battle regarding the adequacy of its 
cost assessment.133  In a recent ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC,134 the 
D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy disclosure rule, in part because 
the agency did not conduct an adequate cost-benefit analysis.135  In a fairly 
scathing opinion, the court held that the agency “acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously for having failed once again . . . [to] adequately . . . assess the 
economic effects of a new rule.”136  The court also determined that the SEC 
“inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and benefits of 
	
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (“Almost half of the total cost—$3.4 billion—would be met with in-house 
company personnel time, and the rest—$4.5 billion—would comprise outflows to 3rd parties 
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 128. Comment Letter from Olympia Snowe, U.S. Senator, et al., to Mary Schapiro, 
Chairman, SEC 1 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-40-10/s
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 132. Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,298, 56,359 (Sept. 12, 2012) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). 
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 134. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 135. Id. 
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the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why 
those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive 
judgments; contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems 
raised by commenters.”137  Given that the Tulane study and other industry 
estimates are drastically higher than the SEC estimate for the costs 
associated with section 1502 compliance, the agency may very well have 
delayed its final regulations to ensure that it can protect against a result 
similar to the Business Roundtable decision.138  Nonetheless, the recent 
challenge of section 1502 by the National Association of Manufacturers and 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce indicates that the affected industries are 
unwilling to merely accept the costs associated with this provision. 
B.  Problems with Determining the Source of Minerals 
One of the more serious critiques of this first-of-its-kind legislation is 
that it is too difficult for companies to determine whether the minerals used 
in production are in fact conflict minerals.139  Shortly after the passage of 
Dodd-Frank, the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI)—both industry trade groups—
commissioned a report by Resolve, an American nonprofit organization, 
which outlined three major challenges concerning conflict mineral 
transparency requirements down to the mining-level.140  These concerns 
were:  (1) supply chains are not sufficiently transparent to this level; 
(2) tracking capacity and accountability mechanisms to this level are 
missing or limited; and (3) the on-the-ground capacity (in conflict regions) 
to differentiate sources and ensure independence from operations that may 
support warring groups does not exist.141 
One particular concern is issuers’ ability to track the origin of gold used 
in their products.  The OECD, which issued guidance for due diligence in 
supply chains for tin, tantalum, and tungsten, finalized its supplement for 
the gold supply chain nine months after publishing its guidance for the 3Ts 
supply chain, adding fuel to the argument that the gold supply chain has 
unique aspects that render it more difficult to regulate.142  In particular, 
advocates for treating gold separately from the other conflict minerals point 
out that gold is refined by thousands of diverse operators, and is often 
	
 137. Id. at 1148–49. 
 138. The Chamber of Commerce and other industry participants have filed suit based on 
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refined more than once.  In addition, newly mined gold is often melded 
together with scrap and other existing stocks of gold, and the sources of the 
already-existing gold is impossible to determine.143  Unlike the other 
conflict minerals listed, gold is inherently valuable and often used as 
currency, making the market for gold very dynamic and fluid, which 
increases the difficulty in charting its supply chain.144 
C.  Timing for Compliance 
An issuer with a disclosure obligation under section 1502 must file its 
first report by May 31, 2014, regardless of its filing date for other SEC 
reports.145  The CMRs due in 2014 cover the calendar year of 2013.  Large 
companies, such as Kraft Foods, have complained that they will need 
additional time to perform proper due diligence on their entire supply 
chains and that the due diligence could take longer than a year.146  The SEC 
has indicated, however, that it will allow for a phase-in period for 
companies required to disclose, so that these companies can perform the 
requisite due diligence of their supply chains.147  The final rule reflects the 
“phase-in period” and refers to the temporary two-year period in which a 
company can state that its products are “DRC conflict undeterminable.”148 
D.  Statutory Liability:  “Furnished” vs. “Filed” 
Another important point regarding the overall efficacy of this provision 
lies in the procedural requirements of the CMR itself and the liability that 
attaches to those requirements.  Section 1502 does not include stated 
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punishments or liabilities for noncompliance with the provision.  According 
to the SEC’s proposed rule, issuers were merely required to “furnish,” 
rather than “file,” the CMR and the certified audit that accompanies it to the 
SEC.149  This difference was not a semantic one; merely “furnishing” the 
report with the Commission meant that the issuer was not open to section 
18 liability.150  This did not mean that these disclosures were immune from 
any liability; rather, they would have been open to the same liability that 
accompanies section 13a and section 15d disclosures.151  Section 13(a) and 
section 15(d) liability typically attaches if an issuer fails to furnish a 
required exhibit or if a required exhibit is “unreliable.”152  The penalties for 
these violations may be injunctive, civil, or criminal and can extend to 
executives of the issuing company.153 
In its proposed rule, the SEC noted that because the conflict minerals 
regulation is vastly different from other reporting requirements that 
typically deal with the financial health of a corporation, it would not submit 
issuers to the additional section 18 liability.154  In practical terms, this 
meant that there would have been no private right of action for failure to 
comply with section 1502, aside from a claim based on fraud.  Instead, only 
the SEC would have had the authority to enforce compliance and to punish 
noncompliance. 
After much pressure from members of Congress and other 
nongovernmental organizations, however, the SEC increased the scope of 
liability in its final rule.  In its final rule, the SEC changed the language of 
the rule to require that issuers file the newly created Form SD and (if 
	
 149. See Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,949–50 (Dec. 23, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b).  In a letter to the SEC on February 16, 
2012, Senator Patrick Leahy, Representative Howard Berman, and other members of 
Congress indicated their concern over the rule’s requirement of “furnishing” rather than 
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U.S.C. § 78j. 
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necessary) the CMR as an exhibit to that form.155  This change now opens 
issuers up to potential shareholder liability, as well as potential 
investigations from the SEC itself.  Of course, the SEC must enforce 
compliance with section 1502 in the same way it enforces compliance with 
its other material disclosure requirements.  This means that the SEC is 
charged with evaluating disclosures made by electronics corporations, 
mining corporations, and others affected by the legislation, to ensure that 
the corporations’ disclosures pertaining to the origin of minerals is 
accurate.156  The SEC will likely rely upon the independently certified 
audits to enforce compliance; however, a certified audit is only required if a 
company determines that it does, in fact, use conflict minerals in its 
products.  This means that any company that denies the use of conflict 
minerals is not required to have a certified audit, and the SEC likely will 
have little capacity to validate that assertion. 
However, the specter of 10b-5 liability that attaches to any disclosure 
requirement should not be underestimated.157  Rule 10b-5 provides a 
private right of action to shareholders injured in the sale or purchase of a 
security by false or misleading statements made by corporate insiders,158 
and the threat of 10b-5 liability alone is sufficient to incentivize a company 
to comply with any statutorily required disclosures.  Rule 10b-5 is the 
biggest proverbial stick available to both the SEC and private shareholders 
and has been referred to as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn”159 as it applies to all corporate statements, not only 
those required in periodic and annual filings.160  The threat of 10b-5 
liability, in addition to the newly accorded private right of action to 
shareholders by virtue of Form SD being “filed” rather than merely 
“furnished,” will surely incentivize issuers to fully comply with the new 
regulation. 
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codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b). 
 156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. V 2011). 
 157. Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 158. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 159. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
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IV.  LEGAL AND GLOBAL POLICY ISSUES WITH SECTION 1502 
Section 1502 represents a marked departure from traditional disclosure 
requirements mandated under section 13.  As discussed above, section 13 of 
the ’34 Act, which was amended by section 1502, historically has required 
broad reporting requirements focused on financial and economic data, 
giving investors insight into the financial health of an issuer and the risks 
associated with any sweeping changes in the company.161  For example, 
one important, and prototypical, section 13 disclosure requirement applies 
to persons holding more than 5 percent of a certain class of security.162  
This disclosure is required because the acquisition of more than 5 percent of 
a certain class of security could indicate the presence of an activist 
shareholder and could result in a substantial change in shareholdings.  A 
holder of more than 5 percent of a certain class of securities can potentially 
seek to influence management or the direction of a shareholder vote or 
transaction.163  This type of information is decidedly financial and, perhaps 
for that reason alone, important to investors. 
Section 1502, however, stands in stark contrast to the existing section 13 
disclosure requirements and to the SEC’s mandate itself.164  In particular, 
the newly instituted statutory disclosure requirement will force companies 
to provide nonmaterial information to investors and the public.  In other 
words, section 1502 statutorily renders material the nonmaterial information 
of the presence of conflict minerals in an issuing company’s product.  
Generating this obligation to disclose a fact that, absent the legislative 
requirement, likely would not affect a reasonable investor’s decision to 
invest in a company, is problematic from both a securities law standpoint 
and a public international law standpoint, as will be discussed below.165 
	
 161. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). 
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A.  Rendering Nonmaterial Information Material 
The critical importance of disclosure in securities law is relevant to the 
critique of section 1502 because, as indicated in the legislative history of 
the Brownback Amendment, Congress hopes that investors will consider an 
issuer’s use of conflict minerals as material information.166  The ultimate 
question, therefore, is whether the use of conflict minerals is material 
information.167  Obviously, the legislation itself renders that question moot 
by statutorily requiring disclosure rather than requiring an analysis of 
materiality.  However, disclosure of social and environmental information 
is typically not required because that information, to date, has not been 
regarded as relevant or material to the financial condition of a company.168  
As noted above, the SEC regulations, while not explicitly adopting an 
economic standard for materiality, implicitly define material information as 
that which bears on the economic value of an investment.169  Consider the 
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at 59. 
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scenario in which a company files a CMR with a clear misstatement of fact 
and is sued by a shareholder.  The materiality question that would be 
paramount to the analysis of such a case is whether the shareholder could 
prove loss or loss causation.  This is typically proven by evaluating the 
change in stock price when the issuer makes various announcements, such 
as the corrective disclosure.170  In the case of conflict minerals, it seems 
unlikely that such a disclosure would drastically move a company’s share 
price, thus proving the immateriality of the information. 
Indeed, the SEC’s proposed rule stated exactly that point: 
It appears that the nature and purpose of the Conflict Minerals Provision 
is for the disclosure of certain information to help end the emergency 
humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC that is financed by the 
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the DRC 
countries, which is qualitatively different from the nature and purpose of 
the disclosure of information that has been required under the periodic 
reporting provisions of the Exchange Act.171 
Amending section 13 to include this disclosure requirement flies in the face 
of the SEC’s mandate, and is not in keeping with the existing disclosure 
requirements of section 13.172  Furthermore, requiring the SEC to enforce 
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omissions by the companies as a violation of their disclosure requirements and 
take appropriate action. 
Id. at 63.  Unger responded by proposing enhanced disclosure requirements for foreign 
registrants conducting business in sanctioned countries, noting that U.S. investors should 
receive adequate disclosures about where the proceeds of their securities investments are 
going and how they are being used, regardless of whether such disclosures were considered 
material under the SEC’s standard of materiality. Letter from Laura S. Unger, Acting 
Chairman, SEC, to Frank P. Wolf, U.S. Representative 3 (May 8, 2001), available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/cpapp6.pdf.  As a result of the 
requirement of additional disclosures set forth in the Unger Letter, in 2004 the SEC created 
an Office of Global Security Risk (OGSR) within its Division of Corporation Finance to 
“monitor whether the documents public companies file with the SEC include disclosure of 
material information regarding global security risk-related issues.” Office of Global Security 
Risk, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/globalsecrisk.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012).  Thus, through the pressure from Congress in the wake of the Sudanese crisis in 
Darfur, the SEC systematically shifted its disclosure requirements beyond the strict 
definition of materiality.  Notably, however, Roger Robinson, Chairman of the Casey 
Institute, stated in his response to the Unger letter that “‘[n]ational security, human rights 
and religious freedom are now regarded as material risks to investors.’” STEIL & LITAN, 
supra, at 65. 
 170. See generally Jon Koslow, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action 
Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811 (1991). 
 171. Conflict Minerals Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,948, 80,960 (Dec. 23, 2010) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 249b) (emphasis added). 
 172. Commissioner Gallagher made this point in his dissenting remarks at the August 22, 
2012, SEC Open Meeting to adopt the final rule: 
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these disclosure requirements stretches thin an already overburdened 
agency and demands that it oversee diplomatic and humanitarian 
regulations for which it lacks the institutional competence. 
B.  Indirect Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:  Regulation of an 
Entire Supply Chain 
In attempting to curb violence in the Congo the stated aim of section 
1502—Congress could have asserted more direct extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and banned any product from any company, domestic or foreign, to be sold 
in the United States if it contained conflict minerals.173  In the case of 
section 1502, however, Congress chose a more indirect approach to meet its 
extraterritorial goals.  Extraterritorial jurisdiction of section 1502 is indirect 
in that foreign firms not registered on an American exchange, and therefore 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, may be forced to comply with the 
provision because they are part of a supply chain in which the final product 
is manufactured by an issuing company.  Although outside the reach of any 
SEC disclosure requirement or liability scheme, a foreign company may 
feel the pressure from an issuing company to have an entire supply chain in 
compliance with section 1502, which may result in foreign companies 
rising to meet the standard required by the provision despite not facing any 
similar requirements in their home jurisdiction. 
Of course, section 1502 is not the first time Congress has indirectly 
allowed for the SEC to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction.  One prior example 
of such indirect jurisdiction is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act174 (FCPA).  
	
It is easy to see that the SEC role in this provision is the anomaly.  That’s because 
disclosure requirements in the securities laws are about telling investors what they 
reasonably should want to know before investing in a company.  The point is to 
give investors information that is inherently “material” to their investment 
decisions.  Disclosure is, and should be, the primary tool for the SEC to use in 
satisfying its mission.  And so it is paramount that we focus on getting timely, 
material disclosures to investors. . . .  Unfortunately, Section 1502 is about 
curtailing violence in the DRC; it is not about investor protection, promoting fair 
and efficient markets, or capital formation.  Warlords and armed criminals need to 
fund their nefarious operations.  Their funding is their lifeline; it’s a chokepoint 
that should be cut off.  That is a perfectly reasonable foreign policy objective.  But 
it’s not an objective that fits anywhere within the SEC’s threefold statutory 
mission. 
Statement of Commissioner Gallagher, supra note 121. 
 173. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM:  RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–39 (2012).  Brummer, in describing territoriality and 
financial statecraft, lists various possibilities for direct extraterritorial application, none of 
which fall directly in line with the jurisdiction of section 1502.  One example of direct 
extraterritorial jurisdiction that he notes is direct regulation of foreign firms, but this applies 
in the case of section 1502 only where the foreign firm is registered on an American 
exchange. Id. at 38.  Another example he observes is jurisdiction over foreign firms when the 
foreign firms engage in conduct that has effects on the regulating country, but section 1502 
does not go this far and does not regulate, at least directly, foreign firms who sell products 
with conflict minerals in the United States. Id. at 40. 
 174. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006)).  In 1977, Congress passed the FCPA, aimed at eradicating bribery 
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Interestingly, both the FCPA and section 1502 require corporate due 
diligence as means of compliance; both provisions arose out of a concern 
regarding foreign activities; and both provisions mirror international 
guidelines and goals.175  Although both regulations aim at stemming an 
activity occurring abroad, the FCPA, unlike section 1502, has its underlying 
roots in preventing market manipulation and fraud.176  This is a critical 
difference, given that the SEC—the agency responsible for ensuring market 
fairness and transparency—is also the regulatory agency responsible for 
enforcing section 1502, and has concurrent jurisdiction over regulating the 
FCPA with the Department of Justice.  In other words, the FCPA involves 
regulation of malfeasance of the corporation’s employees that directly 
relates to an issuer’s financial bottom line, making the SEC a reasonable 
entity for regulating the accounting and records fraud inherent in FCPA 
violations.  Obviously, the SEC has clear jurisdiction over the actions of 
employees or agents of issuers.  Section 1502, on the other hand, deals only 
with disclosures of questionably material information, with the goal that the 
malfeasance of others, not employed or linked to the corporation, be 
stemmed.  That is, section 1502 aims at deterring the activities of warlords 
and rebels in the DRC, not the employees or agents of issuers.  As such, its 
enforcement falls well outside the mandate and expertise of the SEC.177 
	
occurring overseas, for the purpose of obtaining business. Id.  The impetus for this 
legislation was that the SEC had investigated numerous companies in the 1970s and 
discovered that over four hundred companies had made questionable payments totaling over 
$300 million to foreign officials. See Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-
bribery Lasso of the United States:  The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2902–03 (2005).  Specifically, 
the FCPA prohibits the corrupt use of the mail or any other instrumentality of interstate 
commerce in furtherance of any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the 
payment of money or any other thing of value to any person, knowing that all or some of the 
payment will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to 
influence or induce the foreign official to either commit an act in violation of his or her 
lawful duty, or to secure an improper advantage in obtaining or retaining business. 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a) (Supp. V 2011).  In addition to the antibribery provision regulated by the 
Department of Justice, the FCPA also includes accounting provisions that require 
corporations to make and keep books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions of the corporation and to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal 
accounting methods. Id. § 78m. 
 175. See, e.g., OECD, CONVENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 1997, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-bribery
convention/38028044.pdf; OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE 
SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 2011 
[hereinafter OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE], available at http://www.oecd.org/
investment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/46740847.pdf;  
 176. But see Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Fighting 
Global Corruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2009991 (theorizing that the 
FCPA and the act of combatting global corruption is not within the mandate of the SEC and 
that the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA diverts scarce resources from the SEC’s core 
mission). 
 177. See supra Part I. 
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C.  Efficacy of “Name and Shame” Legislation in 
Achieving Humanitarian Goals 
Critics of section 1502 contend that it likely will not have an effect on the 
conflict mineral enterprise in Congo.  First, the thrust of the legislation is 
that it will cause companies to disclose their use of conflict minerals and 
that this disclosure alone will merely result in “naming and shaming.”  
Ideally, the “shaming” will incentivize the corporations to make changes 
and become better corporate actors.  The regulation, however, does not 
require that companies cease, or even attempt to cease, their use of conflict 
minerals.  That is, the efficacy of the provision turns on the public 
consciousness and reaction to learning that certain corporations have 
products that contain conflict minerals.  This, of course, assumes that not 
only investors, but the public at large will review the companies’ websites 
or SEC disclosures to learn whether a particular company has made a 
conflict mineral disclosure.178 
The ultimate consideration concerning the efficacy of the “name and 
shame” legislation is this:  What is the consequence for a company that uses 
conflict minerals and then complies with section 1502 and discloses this 
fact?  In such a situation, the SEC obviously plays no role because the 
company has complied with regulatory standards.  Ostensibly, a company 
can file a CMR with the SEC, publish the CMR on its website, and cross its 
fingers hoping that there is no public backlash that affects its bottom line or 
its brand.  From a public international law standpoint, it would seem that 
the possibility of a remorseless, albeit SEC-compliant company, reduces the 
legislation to a toothless tiger. 
Based on citizen outcry related to conflict minerals, however, it is very 
possible that the “name and shame” legislation could be effective.179  For 
example, some companies were accused of lobbying to undercut the utility 
of section 1502 and were met with backlash from citizens.  Intel, for 
example, had been specifically targeted for the way in which it has handled 
its stance on this legislation and was forced to analyze its supply chain.180  
	
 178. See Ripken, supra note 34, at 146 (“In order for a disclosure system to be effective, 
not only must information that is supplied be disclosed completely . . . it must also be read 
and comprehended by the consumer.”).  The emphasis in securities law on providing 
information to the public is premised on the belief that individuals are rational, self-
governing actors who are willing and able to process the information wisely.  If we assume 
that investors are rational risk calculators who are consistently capable of weighing the costs 
and benefits of risky alternatives and selecting the best option, then a system of disclosure 
makes good sense. 
 179. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 168, at 184 (“Brand reputation, among other 
business incentives, drives companies to manage areas that lie beyond regulatory compliance 
and tangible financial relevance.”). 
 180. See Intel & Congo Minerals, supra note 123.  Intel initially deleted critical 
comments on its Facebook page made by activists over its stance on the conflict mineral 
legislation.  After reinstating the deleted comments, Intel released a statement that said, “For 
well over a year, we have been engaged in both conversations with NGOs and our own 
industry focused on creating workable solutions.  We have shared with our suppliers our 
current position on the issue. . . .  We also support the objective of US legislation to address 
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Indeed, the public awareness of conflict minerals has increased over the 
past few years, with celebrity activists including Robin Wright and Ben 
Affleck lobbying Congress on the issue and writing op-eds online and in 
major newspapers.181 
The general public, however, is not the constituency of the SEC; 
investors are.182  If the SEC administered its regulations with an eye toward 
protecting all citizens, rather than only shareholders, it would be difficult to 
maintain capital formation and to balance the requirements of the agency’s 
mandate.  For this reason, as described in the previous section, the SEC has 
never waded very far into regulation of human rights or even corporate 
social responsibility.183 
D.  Hurting More Than Helping?  A De Facto Embargo 
The likely result of the implementation of section 1502 is that the 
disclosure requirements “may lead to a de facto embargo on formal trade if 
businesses decide to pull out of the region.”184  This concern was addressed 
by Senator Feingold in his statement to the Senate Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs Committee, which reiterated that the goal of the legislation is 
not to shut down the mineral trade, but to support a conflict-free mining 
economy that benefits the Congolese people.185  Nevertheless, Congolese 
activists and others have continually asserted that this regulation will lead, 
and has already led, to an embargo of Congolese minerals, a drastic cost 
	
this problem.” Press Release, Intel, Intel’s Statement on Conflict Minerals Issue (May 19, 
2010), available at http://blogs.intel.com/csr/2010/05/intels_statement_on_conflict_m.php. 
 181. Robin Wright, From Dragon Tattoo to Congo:  Combatting the Scourge of Violence 
Against Women, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2010, 2:22 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/robin/from-dragon-tattoo-to-con_b_1197226.html; Ben Affleck, The 
Deadliest War, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A21. 
 182. See STEIL & LITAN, supra note 169, at 71 (“[T]he SEC is chartered to protect 
American investor interests.  It is not chartered to protect, let alone advance, American 
foreign policy interests.”). 
 183. There are, however, advocates for compelling the SEC to expand nonfinancial, 
social disclosure requirements.  These advocates point to socially conscious investors who 
deem such information as material to their investment decisions.  See, e.g., Monsma & 
Olson, supra note 168, at 161; see also Comment Letter from Iain Richards, Reg’l Head of 
Corporate Governance, Aviva Investors, et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Nov. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-637/4637-11.pdf (advocating for improved 
corporate reporting on supply chain factors because they pose material risks to investors that 
are not typically disclosed); see also Rachel Cherington, Note, Securities Laws and 
Corporate Social Responsibility:  Toward an Expanded Use of Rule 10b-5, 25 U. PA. J. 
INT’L. ECON. L. 1439 (2004). 
 184. U.S. Shines Glare on Congo’s Conflict Minerals, REUTERS, July 21, 2010, available 
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/21/congos-conflict-minerals-idUKLNE66K047201
00721 (quoting Nicholas Garrett, Director, Resource Consulting Services). 
 185. 155 CONG REC. 10599–10600 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feingold).  Notably, both 
dissenting SEC Commissioners at the SEC Open Meeting remarked the logical result of such 
a rule is a de facto embargo of the DRC. See Statement of Commissioner Gallagher, supra 
note 121; Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at SEC Open Meeting to Adopt a Final 
Rule Regarding Conflict Minerals Pursuant to Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Aug. 
22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch082212tap-minerals.htm. 
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that would outweigh any purported benefits of the regulation.186  Indeed, 
with major American corporations shying away from using Congolese 
minerals, certain mines in Congo have suspended operations, forcing many 
Congolese out of work.187  By mid-2011, exports of tin, tantalum, and 
tungsten from the DRC had fallen by 70 percent since the previous summer, 
a phenomenon that the local miners refer to as “Obama’s embargo.”188  
Furthermore, the de facto embargo is not even alleviating the human rights 
abuses occurring in the DRC, which is the stated aim of section 1502.189 
Importantly, conflict minerals legislation could lead to an embargo that 
has only limited international cooperation, which could lead to regulatory 
arbitrage.  As noted above, the third mandate of the SEC’s regulatory 
authority is facilitating capital formation.  This prong is often in tension 
with the other two prongs of the SEC’s authority:  protecting investors and 
maintaining fair markets.  The reason for this tension is that if the U.S. 
markets are highly (or, arguably, overly) regulated, investors will flee the 
U.S. market for less burdensome markets, taking their capital along with 
them.190  This concept of regulatory arbitrage is usually the central critique 
of additional regulations, and section 1502 is not immune to this criticism. 
The assertion that section 1502 will result in open season for other 
countries to exploit Congolese minerals is not without merit.  China, for 
example, has capitalized on the stringent U.S. regulation and now seems to 
possess a virtual monopoly on the Congolese minerals.191  A Congolese 
civil society member stated that the Chinese mineral buyers are 
paying 20 percent less, maybe even 30 percent less than the old price, 
because now they are the only buyers. . . .  The lower price means fewer 
people are bringing minerals to sell, and a lot of mines have suspended 
operations.  But the Chinese are buying what comes to them.  Their 
warehouses are full, with constant turnover.192 
	
 186. See, e.g., David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. TIMES, August 8, 
2011, at A19; see also Hans Bader, Thousands of Jobs and Billions in Wealth Wiped Out by 
Dodd-Frank Conflict Minerals Provision, OPEN MARKET (July 27, 2011), 
http://www.openmarket.org/2011/07/27/thousands-of-jobs-and-billions-in-wealth-wiped-out-
by-dodd-frank-conflict-minerals-provision/. 
 187. See Mary Kay Magistad, Why Chinese Mineral Buyers Are Eyeing Congo, PRI’S 
WORLD (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.theworld.org/2011/10/chinese-conflict-minerals-congo/. 
 188. Editorial, Africa and “Obama’s Embargo,” WALL ST. J., July 18, 2011, at A12. 
 189. Laura Seay, Congo Conflict Minerals Bill Hurts the Miners It Hopes To Help, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 18, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://csmonitor.com/
layout/set/print/content/view/print/398136 (“[C]utting off demand for Congolese minerals on 
international markets does absolutely nothing to stop violence against civilians and only 
makes life for many civilians worse by leaving them with no viable means of financially 
supporting themselves or their families.”). 
 190. See generally Harald Baum, Globalizing Capital Markets and Possible Regulatory 
Responses, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION:  CONFLICT OF LAWS, INTERNET, CAPITAL 
MARKETS AND INSOLVENCY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 77 (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono 
eds., 2000). 
 191. Magistad, supra note 187. 
 192. Id. 
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The optimal solution to the problem of regulatory arbitrage and the 
subsequent exploitation of the American boycott of conflict minerals is that 
other countries will follow suit and enact legislation similar to section 1502.  
Indeed, certain international organizations have encouraged conflict mineral 
regulation in member states, including the OECD and the United 
Nations.193  Ideally, other countries would follow the United States’ 
example and enact legislation similar to section 1502, much like what has 
happened internationally with the FCPA and its international equivalents, 
such as the U.K. Bribery Act.194  Thus, unlike section 1502, the FCPA now 
has international counterparts, making eradication of global corruption a 
truly international goal.  However, in the case of section 1502, until there is 
more international involvement in the potential embargo on Congolese 
minerals the risk for arbitrage and exploitation remains very real and very 
high. 
V.  A BETTER MODEL:  THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND THE CLEAN 
DIAMOND TRADE ACT 
Rather than looking to the SEC to regulate and police the potentially 
unwieldy number of issuers that will produce CMRs, Congress should have 
modeled its conflict mineral regime on the existing conflict diamond 
regulatory scheme.195  In January 2003, a coalition of states, NGOs, and 
corporations launched the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(“Kimberley Process,” or “KPCS”), an international governmental 
certification scheme designed to prevent trade in conflict diamonds.196  
Countries participating in the Kimberley Process were required to pass 
domestic legislation enforcing a set of import and export controls for rough 
	
 193. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1857 (Dec. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1857(2008); OECD DUE 
DILIGENCE GUIDANCE, supra note 175. 
 194. 2010, c. 23 (Eng.). 
 195. Conflict diamonds are defined as “diamonds that originate from areas [in Africa] 
controlled by forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized 
governments, and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments.” U.N. 
Dep’t of Pub. Info., Conflict Diamonds:  Sanctions and War, U.N. (Mar. 21, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html. 
 196. The Kimberly Process, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/
conflict/conflict-diamonds/kimberley-process (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  The initial 
enthusiasm behind the Kimberley Process started as early as 1998, when Global Witness 
began exposing the role that diamonds play in funding conflict in central African states.  In 
May of 2000, representatives from the diamond industry and diamond producing countries 
met in Kimberley, South Africa, to discuss ways of handling the conflict diamond trade. 
Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her Shoes:  The Kimberley Process and the 
Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 CONN. J. INT’L. L., 335, 343 (2007).  This initial 
meeting led to three years of negotiations to enact the Kimberley Process. See id. at 343–44.  
In the Interlaken Declaration of November 5, 2002, representatives of the United States and 
forty-seven other signatory countries announced the imminent launch of the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme.  Id. 
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diamonds.197  Thus, in 2003, President Bush signed the Clean Diamond 
Trade Act198 (CDTA), mandating that the importation into, and exportation 
from, the United States of any rough diamonds be controlled by the KPCS 
standards and procedures.199  Specifically, the KPCS standards required 
that the United States trade rough diamonds only with other signatories to 
the KPCS.200  In addition, according to the KPCS, all participating 
countries’ internal controls must include requiring a certificate of origin for 
all rough diamonds imported or exported.201  The KPCS is chaired by 
participating countries on a rolling basis, and members of the KPCS, as 
well as industry representatives202 and civil society observers, meet twice a 
year at plenary meetings to monitor the success of the regime.203  Although 
not lacking in critics,204 the KPCS has reduced the international trade in 
	
 197. Woody, supra note 196, at 345.  Significantly, the KPCS only regulates rough 
diamonds, or diamonds that have not been cut or polished. See id. at 344.  Rough diamonds 
are also easier to trace because once diamonds are cut and polished, any form of 
identification can be erased. Id. at 344 n.71.  Because the KPCS regime is concerned 
primarily with the source of the diamond, it limited its reach to only rough diamonds. See id. 
at 344. 
 198. Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117 Stat. 631 (2003). 
 199. Id. § 2. 
 200. Raj, supra note 9, at 995–96.  The current participating entities are Angola, Armenia, 
Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Central African Republic, China, 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, European Union members, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Singapore, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. KP 
Participants and Observers, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess
.com/web/kimberley-process/kp-participants-and-observers (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  
These members account for approximately 99.8 percent of the global production of rough 
diamonds. KP Basics, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/
kimberley-process/kp-basics (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 201. Raj, supra note 9, at 995–96. 
 202. The World Diamond Council participates in the KPCS as an observer, monitoring 
the effectiveness of the certification scheme and providing technical and administrative 
advice. See Mission Statement, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.world
diamondcouncil.org/about-wdc/mission-statement (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 203. KP Basics, supra note 200.  The United States is the chair of the KPCS for 2012. Id. 
 204. Recently, the KPCS has come under fire for, among other things, its continued 
inclusion of Zimbabwe among its members.  See, e.g., Loopholes in the Kimberley Process:  
Illegal Trade Undermines Efforts To Combat Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS, 4 (Oct. 
2007), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/loopholes_in_the_kimberley_
process.pdf (noting that the KPCS needed to be more proactive in monitoring 
infringements); Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Leaves Kimberley Process, 
Calls for Diamond Trade To Be Held Accountable (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-leaves-kimberley-process-calls-
diamond-trade-be-held-accountable (announcing that one of the founding NGOs in the 
KPCS abandoned the program because of conflict diamond trading in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, all signatories to the KPCS); see also Devon Maylie, Split Opens 
in Body Monitoring Diamonds, WALL ST. J., Jun. 25–26, 2011, at A11 (detailing how the 
KPCS leadership overrode objections from the U.S. and allowed exports of diamonds from 
the Marange field in Zimbabwe, an area where the Zimbabwe army seized control and 
allegedly committed human rights violations). 
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conflict diamonds to a fraction of 1 percent, as compared to estimates of up 
to 15 percent in the 1990s.205 
Section 1502 and the CDTA are both legislative measures aimed at 
curbing trade in materials that fund rebels in Africa.206  The goal of these 
measures is to establish peace and the rule of law and stem the human rights 
atrocities ravaging the continent.207  There are, however, crucial differences 
	
 205. KP Basics, supra note 200. 
 206. Despite the similar goals of the KPCS and section 1502, there are also differences 
between the materials being regulated by the respective legislation.  Although rough 
diamonds will eventually be cut and polished, they are not smelted or combined with other 
materials before becoming part of a final product.  In this way, it is arguably easier to track 
diamonds in the supply chain.  Diamonds in themselves are valuable and can be used as 
currency, unlike the 3Ts, but much like gold. 
 207. In passing the CDTA, Congress spelled out the human rights violations prompting 
legislative action. See Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 2, 117 Stat. 631, 
631–32 (2003) (“(1) Funds derived from the sale of rough diamonds are being used by rebels 
and state actors to finance military activities, overthrow legitimate governments, subvert 
international efforts to promote peace and stability, and commit horrifying atrocities against 
unarmed civilians.  During the past decade, more than 6,500,000 people from Sierra Leone, 
Angola, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been driven from their homes by 
wars waged in large part for control of diamond mining areas.  A million of these are 
refugees eking out a miserable existence in neighboring countries, and tens of thousands 
have fled to the United States.  Approximately 3,700,000 people have died during these 
wars.  (2) The countries caught in this fighting are home to nearly 70,000,000 people whose 
societies have been torn apart not only by fighting but also by terrible human rights 
violations.  (3) Human rights and humanitarian advocates, the diamond trade as represented 
by the World Diamond Council, and the United States Government have been working to 
block the trade in conflict diamonds.  Their efforts have helped to build a consensus that 
action is urgently needed to end the trade in conflict diamonds.  (4) The United Nations 
Security Council has acted at various times under chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations to address threats to international peace and security posed by conflicts linked to 
diamonds.  Through these actions, it has prohibited all states from exporting weapons to 
certain countries affected by such conflicts.  It has further required all states to prohibit the 
direct and indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless the diamonds are 
controlled under specified certificate of origin regimes and to prohibit absolutely the direct 
and indirect import of rough diamonds from Liberia.  (5) In response, the United States 
implemented sanctions restricting the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to 
those diamonds accompanied by specified certificates of origin and fully prohibiting the 
importation of rough diamonds from Liberia.  The United States is now taking further action 
against trade in conflict diamonds.  (6) Without effective action to eliminate trade in conflict 
diamonds, the trade in legitimate diamonds faces the threat of a consumer backlash that 
could damage the economies of countries not involved in the trade in conflict diamonds and 
penalize members of the legitimate trade and the people they employ.  To prevent that, South 
Africa and more than 30 other countries are involved in working, through the ‘Kimberley 
Process’, toward devising a solution to this problem.  As the consumer of a majority of the 
world’s supply of diamonds, the United States has an obligation to help sever the link 
between diamonds and conflict and press for implementation of an effective solution.  
(7) Failure to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds or to differentiate between the trade in 
conflict diamonds and the trade in legitimate diamonds could have a severe negative impact 
on the legitimate diamond trade in countries such as Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Tanzania.  (8) Initiatives of the United States seek to resolve the regional conflicts in sub-
Saharan Africa which facilitate the trade in conflict diamonds.  (9) The Interlaken 
Declaration on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds of 
November 5, 2002, states that Participants will ensure that measures taken to implement the 
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in the execution of the legislative goals of these two bills.  First, the CDTA 
came into being as a result of American participation in the KPCS.  In other 
words, the international groundswell to handle the problem of conflict 
diamonds existed prior to the enactment of the legislation, and the United 
States joined an international effort by passing domestic legislation 
furthering the aims of the KPCS.  Unlike the formidable beginning of the 
CDTA, there is not similar legislation to that of section 1502 in other 
countries nor is there an international agreement among countries to fight 
the exportation of conflict minerals from the DRC.208  Instead, the United 
States has acted somewhat unilaterally in tackling the humanitarian crisis 
funded by conflict minerals in the DRC.209 
Second, Executive Order No. 13,312 implemented the CDTA, leaving 
the authority over the CDTA’s regulation in the hands of the executive, then 
President George W. Bush.210  In his executive order, Bush assigned certain 
regulatory functions to the Secretary of State211 and others to the Secretary 
of the Treasury (and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control).212  In addition, the CDTA authorizes the Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection to enforce the import and export regulations.213  Section 
1502, on the other hand, will be partially regulated by the SEC.  It is only 
“partially” regulated because if an issuer determines—correctly or not—that 
its product does not contain any conflict minerals, it will not issue a conflict 
mineral report at all, and the SEC likely will not have the resources to 
investigate all companies furnishing conflict mineral reports, let alone all 
companies failing to furnish the report.214  Unlike the CDTA, which 
spreads responsibility of enforcement across agencies best equipped to 
handle certain tasks, section 1502 tasks the SEC with regulation of the 
entire conflict mineral compliance scheme. 
	
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds will be consistent with 
international trade rules.”). 
 208. Although not a binding international agreement, the OECD has issued guidance for 
due diligence on supply chains for conflict minerals. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 209. Some advocates of section 1502 attest that international action is being taken.  For 
instance, the U.N. report issued in November 2011 stated that Rwandan border officials 
returned eighty tons of intercepted minerals to Congolese authorities due to improved 
traceability of parcels of cassiterite, coltan, and wolframite. U.N. Secretary-General, A 
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2012/65 13 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/206/29/PDF/N1220629.pdf. 
 210. Exec. Order No. 13,312, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,151 (July 29, 2003).  
 211. The State Department is responsible for waiving the KPCS requirements if it is in 
the country’s national interests; conducting an annual review of the efficacy of the KPCS; 
publishing a list of all KPCS participants in the Federal Register; creating and coordinating 
the Kimberley Process Coordination Committee; and providing annual reports to Congress.  
The Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for recordkeeping and issuing any licenses or 
regulations necessary for carrying out the CDTA.  Id. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, § 8(c), 117 Stat. 631, 631–32 
(2003). 
 214. See supra Part II.C. 
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Moreover, the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department are a better fit for conflict 
mineral regulation.  These entities handle international affairs and, in the 
case of OFAC, existing sanctions programs.  Because the stated aim of 
section 1502 is to exact diplomatic and humanitarian results, the regulatory 
body should be one more adept at effectuating these types of goals.  The 
SEC, as noted above, is not concerned with international human rights or 
diplomacy issues and should not have its resources tapped to regulate 
section 1502. 
   CONCLUSION 
What is clear about section 1502, both from the legislative history and 
the text of the provision itself, is that its goals are diplomatic and 
humanitarian.  Although these goals are lofty and admirable, Congress 
should not place the burden of achieving these goals on the SEC.  
Additional disclosure requirements aimed at effecting diplomatic ends do 
not comport with the traditional financial disclosure requirements mandated 
by section 13, nor do they effectively solve the international crises they 
seek to alleviate.  Further, the costs associated with the regulation, as well 
as the direct and indirect effects of the legislation on the DRC and adjoining 
countries, are only some of the reasons that section 1502 is an ill-advised 
provision of Dodd-Frank.  In sum, the burden of diplomatic and 
humanitarian aid should come from agencies and groups that can better 
shoulder the formidable responsibility of peacemaking in the DRC. 
